

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THINKING AND BEING: SCHOLASTIC LINGUISTICS AND JACQUES DERRIDA'S "OF GRAMMATOLOGY"

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Abstract: *The Relationship Between Thinking and Being: Scholastic Linguistics and Jacques Derrida's "Of Grammatology"*. Grammatology theory (science of writing) is directed at phonetics and Jacques Derrida hopes to overcome metaphysics. By returning to the semantic issues of the Middle Ages and the concept that traditional metaphysical content can be brought together into signs and sign theory can help to understand and interpret real ways of being, Derrida tries to reinterpret these ideas and reveal the movement of thought in metaphysics, although he is in doubt whether it will ever be possible to go beyond the metaphysics. Derrida refers to scholastic semantics, analyzes how possible the absolute objectivity of language is, looks into the relationship between voice and writing and emphasizes that in writing the voice is replaced by a sign. He notes the attempts of medieval theologians and philosophers to reveal the content of metaphysics on the basis of the concept of equivocation. To this end, a distinction is made between *quod est* and *quo est* modes, and a logical instrumentation is developed to transfer knowledge from one level to another. With the view to transcend Western ontology, Derrida refers to medieval logical linguistics by developing a theory of deconstruction with the destruction of "metaphysics of presence" and a philosophy of "différance". Derrida's decision illustrates the dependence of his thinking on the "metaphysics of presence" by raising the links between the sign and time (Here and Now). Emphasizing the differences between temporal and spatial attitudes, Derrida notes that this is important for the non-metaphysical conception of writing. The article employs the comparative-historiographical method and philosophical reflection and considers the relationship between scholastic linguistics and Derrida's grammatology. To this end, the reflection on the general characteristics and properties of words and the equivocal and univocal features of words in scholastic linguistics and the question of sign in grammatology has been considered.

Keywords: *scholastic linguistics, phenomenological semantics, being, nominal words, universals, equivocation, univocation, grammatology*

„We are disturbed by that which, in the concept of the sign – which has never existed or functioned outside the history of (the) philosophy (of presence) – remains systematically and genealogically determined by that history“ (Derrida 1973, 14).

Introduction

The reflection of being, through the mediation of thought and language, not only determines the way of philosophical thinking, but also establishes human reality itself. In antiquity it was argued that speech is directly related to natural and universal labeling, i. e. the feelings of the soul, through the voice, naturally express things and are produced as spoken language. According to Jacques

Derrida, “the voice is closest to the signified, whether it is determined strictly as sense (thought or lived) or more loosely as a thing” (Derrida 1997, 11). Written language is a derivative and performs technical and representative functions. As noted by Derrida, “The epoch of the logos thus debases writing considered as mediation of mediation and as a fall into the exteriority of meaning” (Derrida 1997, 12-13).

“Différance” is important in writing. It means the difference that describes the relationship between presence and representation, without presupposing the foundation commonality, and naming the difference the elements of which do not exist at the same time. Derrida emphasizes that the whole history of ontology was thinking of “différance” as its forgotten essence.

In the Middle Ages the focus was laid on the theories of the linguistic sign and its meaning, paying particular attention to the rules of logic, the variety of grammatical forms and their combinations, Aristotle’s lexicon, where a word form that encoded a *being* combined content and expression (Kowalczyk, 2001). Aristotle linked logic categories not only to language but to *being* as well. He claimed that *beings* are related to words and that language reflects not only the properties of *beings* but also the relationship between *beings* and *phenomena*. “SUCH things are termed “relatives”, which are said to be what they are, from belonging to other things, or in whatever other way they may be referred to something else; thus “the greater” is said to be what it is in reference to another thing” (Aristotle, Ch. 7, 6a).

Scholastic logical-philosophical analysis of language extended Aristotle’s theory of formal logic. Around 510 AD Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius wrote commentaries on the Porphyrian Phoenician treatise *Isagoge* (Introduction), which he translated into Latin. The Porphyrian Phoenician treatise *Isagoge* is an introduction to and interpretation of the terms of the Aristotelian Categories. In his commentary Boethius analyzed the specifics of thinking, the emergence of thought statements, their transformation into reality concepts expressed in language. The famous medieval discourse on universals, i. e. general concepts, lasted for several centuries. The commentaries of Boethius played a key role in the process of analysis on the meaning of terms which in the discourse on the existence of universals became name and statement predicates.

Scholastic semantics played an important role in the phenomenological analysis of the relationship between language and being. In the framework of scholastic semantics, Jacques Derrida raised the dilemma of empiricism and transcendence in the phenomenological interpretation of language. He explored how a possible absolute objectivity of language, solves the relationship between voice and writing. He maintained that in writing the voice is replaced by a sign.

The object of the article is the relationship of scholastic linguistics and Derrida’s grammatology.

The article aims to look into the expression of scholastic linguistics and the relationship between scholastic linguistics and the question of sign in Derrida’s grammatology.

The aim dictates the focus on the following tasks:

- description of general characteristics and properties of words,
- consideration of the equivocal and univocal features of words,
- reflection on the concept of sign in grammatology.

The analysis is performed with relation to the nature of things and with respect to grammatology of Jacques Derrida.

Words denoting things and universals

In medieval logical semantics, there were two types of words. The words of the first type were characterized by a narrow meaning, e. g. the words *man* or *white*. The words that belonged to the

second type were described as syncategorematic terms. They were characterized by the absence of a concrete meaning, e. g. *is, if, or, some*. When analyzing the words-terms, the representatives of dialecticism tried to determine their regular meaning, or in other words, *a constant* and the way in which it was used. The analysis was based on Aristotle's assertion that words and names have definite meanings, and that the man's ability to think helps to create new meanings. Aristotle described language as "the expression of the meaning in words" (Aristotle, 1922: 29). He focused on metaphors and their function and stated that "metaphor is the application of an alien name by transference either" (Aristotle 1922, 77). Aristotle emphasizes how important it is to be able to use metaphors, and that this skill cannot be learned. In his opinion, "it is the mark of genius, for to make good metaphors implies an eye for resemblances" (Aristotle 1922, 87).

According to Alain de Libera the discourse on universals dates back to Anselm of Canterbury Treatise "De Grammatico" (Anselmi, 1853). The work unveils the original treatment of Aristotle's semantics, revealing the establishment of systemic relationship between linguistic phenomena and their change. Analyzing two different meanings of the same word and attempting to reconcile them, Anselm introduced the as yet unknown principle of semantic reference theory, by means of which grammar, use of forms of linguistic expressions interconnected by logic, revealed the relationship between a term and its object. Libera assumed that the most important merit of Anselm was this insight, "from which centuries of medieval speculation began" (Libera 1993, 294). Referring to Aurelius Augustine's theory of Exemplarism, Anselm argued that universals are real because God created the diversity of things according to prototypes of genus and specific differences. Having studied the works of Aristotle and Boethius, as well as Roman grammar-books, Anselm tried to apply Aristotle's theory of categories for the analysis of "nominal words". By introducing the dialectic method, he established the appellative function of the thing – name through double differentiation, i. e. he separated meaning and word by distinguishing *per se* and *aliud*. Anselm wrote: "the name of a thing is appellative of that thing when it is the name by which that very thing is itself called in the customary course of utterance" (Anselm 1998, 123-150), (Anselmi 1853, 570-571).

The words in Aristotle's logic refer to the general attributes and characteristics of primary and secondary substances. This is born out by Aristotle's claim that *white* indicates quality and nothing further (Aristotle, 1853, Ch.5, 3b). According to Libera, the meaning of the word *white* is not universally general, since Aristotle did not say that all common words denote a characteristic or express a subject's distinctiveness. Aristotle emphasizes that primary substances have a definite meaning because they denote a definite being. Speaking about secondary substances Aristotle maintains that "the definition and the name are both predicated of the subject, for you will predicate the definition of "a man" concerning "a certain man", and likewise the definition of "animal" (Aristotle 1853, Ch.5, 3a). Consequently, secondary substances have a single and common name that is common to several individuals, e. g. *a tree* or *a plant*. Species and genera, as a characteristic of secondary substance, semantically do not function as specific words, e. g. as *white*, because "*white* signifies nothing else but a thing of a certain quality". They function as the substance of some property (Aristotle 1853, Ch.5, 3b).

In developing Aristotle's semantic ideas, Anselm used them not only for linguistics but also for scholastic theory of cognition in order to solve the problem of the existence of universals and their relation to the substance and reality of the thing. The problem solving contributed to the role of logical semantics in theology and the anchoring of theological elements in gnoseology.

In the 12th century, a French theologian and logician Peter Abélard, joined the discussion on the expression of universals (Clanchy 2000, 105). Abélard opposed the realistic view and stated that common concepts are acquired because they are the result of certain intellectual operations. Abélard set out the arguments for criticism of the realist approach in his "Treatise in Logic"

(De Intellectibus) stating that “if humanness is a real thing, as the theory of realism argues, if it is the essence of every individual, how can it coexist in two different places with two different individuals? And if animalness is the real thing and the essence of the individual, then a clever animal and the one without any cleverness would be one and the same. Thus, Socrates then would be a donkey” (Abélard 1994, 134).

In “The Glosses on Porphyry”, Abélard specified that if individual differences were recognized to be different forms, then the universal substance would coincide with the divine substance. In that case, the reality would be identical to divinity and then this would be pantheism (Abélard 1994, 125-139). Abélard’s arguments forced the representatives of realist position to introduce corrections into their doctrine. However their new statements did not convince Abélard because he did not see any substantiation, for him they were not reasonable enough. Abélard held the view that each individual can be treated according to differences and non-differences from others: for differences, an individual is the object of thought, and for non-differences - a universal.

Abélard also did not agree with the realist concept of universals because universals cannot be found in the things themselves and are expressed by name or word. The word in Abélard’s logical linguistics is not a simple physical reality. The meaning of the word lies in the word itself and it is actualized in the process of speech when the things are named, or, in other words, in the act of predication. Abélard believed that the mind that is involved in the construction of the predicate catches the alien reality by naming it and at the same time answering the question of *what it is*. Later, upon hearing the same name, the mind could recognize the meaning of the word. Thus, the function of the mind is to uncover the possibilities for discovering the universals, defined by Abélard as a meaningful sound or voice (*vox significativa*) that creates the communication both between parts of speech and between things themselves. Abélard stated that things described themselves by using sounds.

In the concept of predication the connector *to be (esse)* plays a critical role. Abélard distinguished between two types of connectors: the grammatical, which plays a constructive role, and the dialectic, which performs a predicative function. Grammatical connector does not determine the real or supposed existence of objects, it is concerned with the grammatical alignment of thoughts. The predicative function is related to the nature of objects and their true being. Thus, a universal, as well as predication, depends on the thing, though it is not a thing itself.

When dealing with the predication of the verb *to be* in an existential plane, Abélard faces some contradictions and ambiguities, i. e. equivocation. This issue was analyzed by Aristotle and later described by Boethius, giving the term *equivocation* a broader meaning. Abélard argues that equivocation is not just about names, but also about verbs, and that equivocation is also quite common in prepositions and conjunctions. Therefore, according to Abélard, when Aristotle speaks, “that they only have a common name”, that name is to be understood as any sound marking of things (Boethius 1874, 164). Abélard explained the cause of equivocation by the dual way of the existence of the thing: one for God, the other for Man. Abélard did not fully elaborate on the theories of predication, but according to Jean Jolivet, “this eminent thinker produced a wonderful and profound doctrine that has pushed the process of thinking forward” (Jolivet 1994, 108).

Equivocation and univocation of the word

In the discourse of medieval theologians and philosophers, the questions of equivocation and univocation were developed with reference to the semantic plane presented by Boethius. Equivocation (*aequivoca*), for Boethius, is something with a common name. However, the ratio

of the substance corresponding to the name is different. The things with the same name and definition were called by him univocal (univoca) (Boethius 1874, 163).

Abélard and Anselm of Laon welcomed the idea of equivocation and univocation described by Boethius. Other philosophers, e. g. Gilbert of Poitiers who promoted Platonic realism in order to bring it closer to Aristotle's philosophy, treated equivocation and univocation differently from Boethius and Abélard (Gilson 1989, 140-141). According to Neretina, Gilbert of Poitiers "derived equivocation from the various types of arguments that were indicated in Boethius' *Theological Treatises*. It was necessary to elucidate the view of the ratio not only as a reasoning process, but also as an argument that could be used in one or more disciplines, since each of them contained a certain common statement" (Neretina 2001, 374).

In addition, Gilbert observed that the equivocation of *quo est* and *quod est* leads to paradox statements that become dangerous to theological science. Thus, he tried to create a logical instrumentation to help him assess the correctness of the statements as well as identify which area (theology or physics) the knowledge belonged to. Thus, according to Gilbert, theological questions could be considered on the basis of logical requirements of signifying discourse. Gilbert linked the functions of logical instrumentation to: 1) the definition of subsistence, i. e., he showed how *essence* finds its being; 2) the transumption that transfers terms from one to another knowledge area by changing their meaning; 3) the determination of essentiality, singularity, dividuality.

Gilbert formulated the idea of singularity with reference to Abélard's theory of *conceptualism* and stated that an object appears in the consciousness of the perceiver as a specific whole, i. e. as the universal of a thing expressed verbally. According to Gilbert, the thing that appears in consciousness may be real or nonexistent, however "any concept of non-existence is an assumption (opinio), for example, Centaur that has two bodies or three-headed Chimera" (Gilbert 1874, 1360). The *quo est* singularity of the thing helps to reveal the reality of the thing *quod est* because for Gilbert any being is one by number and a certain being is singular, expressing one natural thing by number. According to Neretina, in Gilbert's theory, the mechanism of fusion of *quo est* and *quod est*, gives birth to a subject through the operation of the principle of intent (Neretina 2001, 377).

The absolute fusion of *quod est* and *quo est* is in God, so the Prime Being or God, according to Gilbert, is portrayed both as Creator and as Simplicity. Such a description makes it possible to say of God that "He is what He is" and does not presuppose that God came into being through a kind or a species-creating subsistence. Therefore, "even if we say that the origin of God is different from the origin of man, then in no way should we understand this origin as the form of the genus" (Gilbert 1874, 1368). Thus, the otherness of God's origin and the ambiguity of the term origin led Gilbert to determine "correlation of a thing with names and definitions – their univocation (unambiguity) or equivocation" (Neretina 2001, 378).

Gilbert used Boethius' concept of equivocation which, according to Boethius, was part of the discourse with four varieties. The first variety that was singled out by Boethius referred to the things with the same name and definition. This is univocation. Boethius provided the example where an animal and a human being had the same descriptions – they both could be described as living substances and sensing substances. Things that are not linked by names or definitions, for example, *fire, stone, color*, etc. exhibit the second variety. They were named diversivocals (*diversivoca*). Things that are called by different names and defined by the same definition, for example a *sword* and *wedge* - fit the third variety, called multivocation (*multivoca*). Things that have the same name but are defined differently, for example, a human alive and a human on a picture, are linked to the fourth variety, called the equivocation (*aequivoca*) (Stančiene 2009, 100).

According to Gilbert, the concept of equivocation and univocation helps us understand the nature of the Creator and reveal the truth of the faith through grammar and logic. In his Treatise on the Trinity (*De Trinitate*), he revealed the metaphysical and gnoseological nature of

universals, associating it with God's three-person theologema. He divided universals into two types: God's thoughts were attributed to the first type, while the second type assigned the ideas that are the natural forms (*forma native*) of things.

Discussing the nature of God, Gilbert stated that each person of the Divine Trinity constitutes a generic form of divinity. Theologians responded to this claim and in 1146 a French abbot Bernard of Clairvaux issued a negative review. Gilbert was also criticized by Peter Lombard, Bishop of Paris, and a theologian Robert of Melun. Later, Gilbert had to stand challenge at Reims Council in 1148. He was attacked there by theologians and especially Bernard of Clairvaux. However, his condemnation was not announced.

According to Etienne Gilson, “the philosophical attitude with regard to created reality is so fundamental in Gilbert that he cannot completely detach himself from it when he tackles the theological problem of divine being. We have seen him affirm first that God is absolute entity (*essentia*) and that he is nothing but that (*simplex atque sola essentia*)” (Gilson 1989, 144). The distinction between God and divinity is that it announces the invasion of theology by a conceptual realism. Gilbert, who acknowledged the reality that is understood and accepted by mind, portrayed finite beings as composed of a subject and of abstract determinations which, by qualifying it, cause it to be what it is.

At the end of the Middle Ages, metaphysics was replaced by semiology. The statements of logical semantics in the works of Aristotle, Boethius, Abélard, Gilbert and other philosophers were reinterpreted and there were attempts to comment on the content of metaphysics in the theory of signs. It was also argued that signs of scholastic logic could not fully reveal the differences. In theological and philosophical discourses of the end of the 13th century and the beginning of the 14th century, special attention was paid to the issue of the intelligible *species* and theories of the linguistic sign and its meaning.

One of the most prominent researchers in this area is William Ockham, who claimed that the concept of a linguistic sign is equal to the concept of a term. He described discourse, as a system of specific signs which is divided in the same way as are terms: “discourse is of three types – the written, the spoken, and the conceptual (this last existing only in the mind). In the same way there are three sorts of terms – written, spoken, and conceptual”. Ockham admitted that terms are the elements that form a proposition. A proposition, then, confirms or denies that something is or is not (William of Ockham 1974, 49).

Terms are signs (*signa*) and their central function is to define objects. Ockham recognized that terms are of different origin and types, and, thus, a written term is a part of a proposition, which has been inscribed on something material and physically visible to the bodily eye. “The spoken term is a part of a proposition, which has been uttered aloud and is physically heard by the bodily ear. The conceptual term is an intention or impression of the soul, which signifies or consignifies something naturally and is capable of being a part of mental proposition and of supposition in such a proposition for the thing it signifies” (William of Ockham 1974, 49).

The first two types of terms are defined as conventional signs with different verbal and graphic expressions in different nations. Meanwhile, the third type of terms functions as natural signs of things (*signa naturalia*), which are the result of the interaction between the mind and a recognizable object. In the comments on conceptual terms (concepts), Ockham refers to Augustine of Hippo and affirms that these terms and the propositions made from them are mental words, the essence of which resides in the intellect, so they do not belong to any language, they are the same for all people and all nations. A spoken word expressed in a verbal form or in a graphical form and unrelated to the concept of the mind, would lose its meaning because, according to Ockham, “a concept primarily and naturally signifies something and a spoken word signifies the

same thing secondarily” (William of Ockham 1974, 50). Spoken words are signs of concepts to describe the same object. The concept reflects reality and makes it perceptible.

Ockham divided the terms into categorematic and syncategorematic, which divide the utterance into material and formal elements. Categorematic terms have a precise and clear meaning, as “the term *man* signifies all men; the term *animal* implies all animals; and the term *whiteness* stands for all whitenesses” (William of Ockham 1974, 55). Syncategorematic terms do not have a precise and definite meaning and they do not signify any thing, but acquire meaning only when used with categorematic terms, e. g., *any*, *all*, *only*, *some*, *because*, etc.

In addition, Ockham notes that philosophers often use another division of names. They divide names into purely absolute and connotative. Purely absolute names are those which signify one thing primarily, for example *man*, *stone*, *fire*, etc. Connotative names express one thing referring to another thing, such as the term *white* expresses the whiteness of another thing.

When speaking of terms, Ockham noted that the verbal and graphic expression of a term as a conventional sign can be equivocal or univocal: “only words – conventional signs – can be univocal or equivocal” (William of Ockham 1974, 55). Meanwhile, intentions of the soul or concepts are not equivocal or univocal *per se*. According to Ockham, “a word is equivocal if, in signifying different things, it is a sign subordinated to several rather than one concept or intention of the soul” (William of Ockham 1974, 75). For Ockham “every expression that is subordinated to just one concept is called univocal, whether the term signifies several different things or not” (William of Ockham 1974, 76). Thus, according to Ockham, the term becomes univocal *per se* because all of the several things it signifies are also signified by one concept, by only one intention of the soul.

Sign and Grammatology

The end of the 19th century witnessed the interest in linguistics as a system of signs, where signs represented real or abstract objects. The formalization of systems turns back again to scholastic semiotics. Signs are found not only in the world that we can access, but also in the world that we are not able to access. Accordingly, signs become not only vectors of existing, real things, but also vectors of transcendence, mysticism, mystery. Thus, there is a clear reversion to the questions discussed by Ockham, since he argued that the traditional content of metaphysics can be brought together into signs and, with the help of sign theory, to understand and interpret the ways in which a common object exists.

In 1916, Ferdinand de Saussure introduced the term semiology, which in his opinion was the science of signs: “A science that studies the life of signs within society is conceivable; it would be a part of social psychology and consequently of general psychology; I shall call it semiology (from Greek semeion ‘sign’). Semiology would show what constitutes signs, what laws govern them. Since the science does not yet exist, no one can say what it would be; but it has a right to existence, a place staked out in advance. Linguistics is only a part of the general science of semiology” (Saussure 1959, 16). Any sign system, in his view, is an object of semiology. Saussure defined the sign as the opposite of two components: the signifier (sound, gesture, inscription, any material expression) and the signified (distinctive value in the lexical system). Such a binary structure of the sign opens up a phonological or semantic way of analysis. However, these two components together form a sign, which is a criterion of being.

As for the modern theory of the language sign, it is closely related to the medieval reduction of universals to *flatus vocis* by Roscelin of Compiègne (1050 – 1125). The concept of Roscelin of Compiègne, which states that there are no universals and there exists only the name, was called

nominalism. At the end of the 19th century this theory revived in discussions about what lies behind the language sign. The discussion pushed the creation of the phonological model. In 1967, Jacques Derrida was writing in his study “Speech and Phenomenon: And Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs” (*La voix et le phénomène*) that “the essence of language is in its telos; and its telos is voluntary consciousness as meaning [*comme vouloir-dire*]” (Derrida 1973, 36).

In the same year, there appears another work written by Derrida – “Of Grammatology”. In this work Derrida tries to abandon any relationship with metaphysics and looks into the essence of logocentrism and phonocentrism. Metaphysics, in his view, is a *topos*, a disciplined space that will liberate the sign upon deconstruction. Deconstruction is not perceived as the analysis or critique of a subject, but as an event that liberates the difference in signs, showing the limits of each phenomenon, but not leading to any new derivative of existence.

Derrida primarily deconstructs the “metaphysics of voice”, since voice and speech are closer to the nature of thought, i. e. the voice completely coincides with the uttered thought and represents consciousness. Derrida takes advantage of the difference between Saussure’s signifier and signified, and identifies the difference between language and speech. He emphasizes the importance of the play of these differences for the non-metaphysical conception of writing. Derrida develops a general theory of writing. He claims that there is a certain “writing in speech”. The questions on the issue of writing that are analyzed in *Of Grammatology* relate to historical stand. Thus, he discusses the genealogy of writing, the phoneticization of writing. He uses the method of deconstruction and introduces writing into all spheres of life. In writing, according to Derrida, it is important to understand the difference because the voice is replaced by the sign. The idea of the sign that is defined in semiology, according to Derrida, cannot be preserved “without the difference between sensible and intelligible, certainly, but also not without retaining, more profoundly and more implicitly, and by the same token the reference to a signified able to “take place” in its intelligibility, before its “fall”, before any expulsion into the exteriority of the sensible here below” (Derrida 1973, 13).

In this way, the mind-perceived aspect of the sign, according to Derrida, is directly related to ideality, and the formal essence of the sign can be defined on the basis of being. He emphasizes that “the sign and divinity have the same place and time of birth. The age of the sign is essentially theological. Perhaps it will never end. Its historical closure is, however, outlined” (Derrida 1973, 14). Thus, the world around us is signed by logos that is perceived as the reality established by a transcendental signified called God. To know this reality and to recognize the “right” and “inappropriate” elements is to break free from sensuality through rational thinking. However, reality never appears directly, but only through the sign, and Derrida wants to maintain the diversity of meanings of the sign, linking it to the context of difference.

Conclusions

In scholastic semantics, the concept of sign in the act of signification legitimized the relationship with a specific being. The sign is used to show and express something that exists and thus the sign performs an epistemological reference function.

In grammar the dialectical approach established the appellative function of the noun through the double differentiation. It helped to differentiate the meaning and the name in the nouns, distinguishing the meanings of the noun *per se* and *per aliud*. In this way, the previously unused principle of semantic reference theory was introduced. It helped grammar that used logically interconnected forms of linguistic expressions to reveal the relationship between a unitary term and the object it refers to.

In scholastic logical linguistics, the word was given a distinctive meaning, which was actualized during speech, when objects are named, or in other words, an act of predication is performed. Predication highlighted certain contradictions and ambiguities, i. e. equivocation, which in scholastic linguistics expanded its boundaries and was applied not only to nouns but also to verbs. Peter Abélard explained equivocation in a twofold way of the presence of an object – one for God and one for Man.

Objects that are described by the same name and definition were called univocals, and determination of their essence (*quod est*) helped to reveal the real mode of existence of objects (*quo est*), the reason why objects exist and why they belong to a certain family or species that does not require any accidentions. In Gilbert of Poitiers' theory, due to the operation of the intention principle, the mechanism of merging *quo est* and *quod est*, which gives birth to the subject, was legitimized.

Jacques Derrida's grammatology expressed a new way of philosophical analysis - deconstruction. It is an attempt to escape the field that developed between the history of metaphysics and the history of its destruction. Deconstruction is an attempt to reveal a structure in thinking that can be studied as a basis and source of material thinking. It is an attempt to explain the basics of logocentrism and phonocentrism as well as the modern theory of the language sign.

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